Seventeen Point Agreement For The Peaceful Liberation Of Tibet

In 1951, the United States informed the Dalai Lama that, in order to obtain U.S. assistance and support, he had to leave Tibet and refuse “forced agreements” between representatives of Tibet and China. [5] In 2012, the Dalai Lama mentioned that the seventeen-point agreement had been signed in the spirit of one country, two systems. [6] [7] According to the Tibetan government in exile, some members of the Tibetan cabinet (Kashag), such as Tibetan Prime Minister Lukhangwa, never accepted the agreement. [14] But the National Assembly of Tibet “recognizing the mitigating circumstances in which the delegates had to sign the agreement, asked the government to accept the agreement… Kashag told Zhang Jingwu that it would radionalize its agreement on the agreement. [15] After the occupation on 23 May 1951 of the capital of the eastern province of Chamdo, the People`s Republic of China (PRC), Tibet forced to sign the 17-point agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet. The alternative, according to the occupying forces, is an immediate military operation in the rest of Tibet. Photo after Claude Arpi`s exhibition. The third point of the agreement: “The Tibetan people have the right to exercise national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the central government.” The Chinese have certainly made new labels for Tibetans, but they are only personal seals on which the name of each delegate was engraved. Otherwise, there was no forged government seal. Part of the confusion is due to the fact that Ngabo had in his possession the seal of the governor of eastern Tibet, but that he decided not to use it. However, this label was not the official seal of the Tibetan government, so the non-use of the agreement did not reduce the validity of the agreement.

In his autobiography, the Dalai Lama states that Tibetan delegates claimed that they had been forced to sign the agreement “under duress” … Their sense of coercion stems from China`s general threat to regain military force in central Tibet if no agreement is reached. However, under international law, this does not invalidate any agreement. As long as there is no physical violence against the signatories, an agreement will apply. However, the validity of the agreement rests on the full power of the signatories to conclude an agreement and, as we have seen, this was clearly not the case. In this sense, the Dalai Lama actually had reason to deny it. [17] The 17-point agreement is a very important valid historical document that reveals the true nature of Sino-Tibetan relations at this decisive turning point in the history of Tibetan independence.